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Speculative Attack and Informational Structure:  
An Experimental Study 
Camille Cornand
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Titre Français : Attaque spéculative et structure informationnelle : une étude expérimentale 
 
RESUME : 
Ce papier s’intéresse à la question de la déstabilisation d’une économie par des signaux 
publics dans un contexte où les informations sont de nature différente. Nous présentons une 
expérience sur le jeu de l’attaque spéculative de Morris et Shin (1998). Notre objectif est 
double : (i) évaluer si l’information publique déstabilise l’économie dans un contexte où les 
signaux sont de nature différente ; et (ii) élargir les résultats de Heinemann, Nagel et 
Ockenfels (2002). Notre étude suggère que dans les sessions avec signaux commun et privé, 
le fait que le signal joue un rôle focal améliore le bien être de la banque centrale : sa présence 
réduit la probabilité de crise et accroît sa prévisibilité. En termes de politique économique, la 
banque centrale a plus de contrôle sur les croyances des spéculateurs si elle fournit au marché 
un signal clair, lorsque celui-ci reçoit aussi des signaux privés.  
 
MOTS-CLES : Attaques spéculatives – Information privée – Information publique. 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This paper addresses the question whether public information destabilises the economy in the 
context of signals of different nature. We present an experiment on the speculative attack 
game of Morris and Shin (1998). Our objective is double: (i) evaluating whether public 
information destabilises the economy in a context of signals of different nature; and (ii) 
enlarging the results of Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2002). Our evidence suggests that 
in sessions with both private and common signals, the fact that the public signal plays a focal 
role enhances the central bank’s welfare: it reduces the probability of crisis and increases its 
predictability. In terms of economic policy, the central bank has more control on the beliefs of 
traders if it discloses one clear signal when agents also get private information from other 
sources. 
 
KEY-WORDS: Speculative attacks, Private information, Public Information. 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: F3, C9. 
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1. Introduction 
The policy response to the recent turbulence in international financial markets has been to call 
for increased transparency through information disclosures from governments and other 
official bodies as well as from the major market participants (International Monetary Fund, 
1998 and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999). Increased transparency could 
prevent from speculative crashes and, simultaneously, make sure that unsustainable pegs be 
corrected early enough. Indeed, public information is expected to reduce efficiency losses 
stemming from coordination failures: since market expectations are influenced by central 
bank disclosures – and in return have an impact on financial variables –, monetary policy is 
more effective if it can coordinate market expectations. However, there exists a current 
discussion on the optimal modes of information disclosure. This paper thus addresses the 
question whether public information destabilises the economy in a context of signals of 
different nature. 
Theoretically, the impact of public information is large: public information is extremely 
effective at influencing decisions and coordinating actions. There is even a danger arising 
from the fact that it is too effective at doing so. For example, the model of Morris and Shin 
(2002) predicts that agents follow more public than private information when signals are of 
the same precision. Agents overreact to public information and thereby magnify the damage 
done by any noise. 
Empirically, the impact of public and private information on the coordination of agents has 
been studied by experimental economics. While Cabrales, Nagel and Armenter (2002) 
wondered about which equilibrium prevails if agents possess either private or public 
information, Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2002) also compare the individual impact of 
such informational structures on the decision making process. They present an experiment 
which imitates a speculative attack model à la Obstfeld (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998) 
and show that the predictability of an attack is slightly higher in public information than 
private information, but the prior probability is also higher in public information. If this 
experiment tends to validate the global game theory, it however appears that the destabilising 
effects of public information, linked with the existence of multiple equilibria, can be less 
severe than what is predicted theoretically. The rationale for the fact that the experiment 
shows that agents’ behaviour is very similar in both informational contexts (sessions in public 
information and sessions in private information) is the following (Heinemann, 2002). On the 
one hand, transparency increases predictability and reduces efficiency losses linked to non-
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coordinated activities; on the other, public information increases the probability of an attack 
by reinforcing the agents’ beliefs in the capacity of the group of coordinating on the efficient 
strategy. This suggests that public information does not necessarily lead to common 
knowledge: even if public announcements should theoretically lead to higher order beliefs 
close to common knowledge, differences in the treatment of public information seem to create 
sufficient private beliefs to avoid self-fulfilling beliefs equilibria and thus common 
knowledge.  
Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2002) consider two informational treatments in the context 
of the speculative attack game: public information on the fundamental state of the economy 
on the one hand, and private information on the other. In this paper, we propose to analyse the 
impact of public information on how agents coordinate in presence of both public and private 
signals. More precisely, does public information have the same coordination power when 
agents also get private signals? To answer such a question, we analyse in details two different 
informational treatments: simultaneous noisy public and private informational signals and two 
noisy public information signals (i.e. benchmark case). This experimental study aims at 
drawing a comparison between those two treatments to catch the impact of public 
information. Therefore, it has two main objectives: to empirically evaluate the relevance of 
the informational structure during a speculative attack with an experiment and to enlarge the 
results acquired by Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2002) (HNO, 2002).  
We find that there is a significant difference between the two treatments. Our evidence 
suggests that in public and private information treatment, the public signal always plays a 
more important role in the decision taken by agents: success and thus probability of an attack 
clearly more depend on the public signal. The main result is that the probability of a crisis is 
always smaller and the predictability better achieved in simultaneous private and public 
signals than in otherwise equal treatment with two common signals. However, it is not clear 
in which of the two treatments coordination is better achieved. On the one hand, the existence 
of a focal point in public and private information treatment should reinforce the capacity of a 
group to coordinate; on the other hand, the presence of private information avoids 
overreaction linked to self-fulfilling beliefs in total common information games. In terms of 
economic policy, our result suggests that the central bank has more control on the beliefs of 
traders if it discloses one clear signal, when agents additionally get private information from 
other sources. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sums up the main theoretical 
results about the role of the informational structure in speculative attack games. Section 3 lays 
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out the experimental design based on HNO (2002). Section 4 details the results of the 
experiment, in terms of agents’ decision, probability of an attack, predictability of an attack, 
coordination and welfare losses. Section 5 compares our results with the study by HNO 
(2002) and section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Theoretical predictions 
The possibility to analyse the role of information disclosure is relatively recent. The literature 
on “global games” shows that there can exist a unique equilibrium in a framework where 
multiple equilibria would exist in a situation of common knowledge on economic 
fundamentals. The existence of the unique equilibrium in such games allows studying the 
impact of information with the means of comparative statics. After rapidly presenting the 
reduced form of the speculative attack game, we give the theoretical results under different 
informational assumptions. 
2.1. The speculative attack game as a coordination game in incomplete information 
We describe a very simple version of the model of Morris and Shin (1998), inspired from 
Heinemann (2002).  
The game comprehends an infinite number of small traders [ ]0,1i ∈  who decide whether to 
attack or not. The fundamental state is noted Y. A higher Y is interpreted as a better state of 
the economy. If the proportion of traders who attack exceeds a hurdle function a(Y ) (a'<0), 
the attack succeeds and each attacking agent receives a reward equal to Y. However, if the 
attack fails, attacking agents get 0. Whatever happens, non-attacking agents always get a 
reward equal to T. 
2.2. Predictions with respect to the informational structure of the game 
We give the main theoretical predictions of this game under different informational structures: 
public information, private information, and, finally, simultaneous public and private signals. 
2.2.1. Public information 
In the second-generation models with common knowledge on economic fundamentals Y, 
coordination is due to a sunspot (i.e. a public announcement), which coordinates the actions 
of all the speculators. A canonical model is Obstfeld (1996), in which there exist three zones 
of fundamental states (as shown in Figure 1): 
- if Y < T, the fundamental state is so good that no attack can occur; 
- if Y >Y , the fundamental state is so bad that there will be a devaluation for sure; 
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- if T<Y<Y , there exist two pure strategy equilibria: all the agents attack or none of them 
attack. 
In such a context, the simple fact that a signal be common knowledge coordinates agents’ on 
an equilibrium (rather than another). There is an indetermination in the theory, which is linked 
to the coordinating power of public information. Beliefs are self-fulfilling and the result is 
linked to a change in anticipations and not directly to fundamentals in the sense that worse 
fundamentals are more likely to conduct to the bad equilibrium in the zone of indeterminacy. 
We call this situation the Common Information game (CI). 
Such an analysis raises doubts about the advantages of public information disclosure as 
advocated by International Financial Institutions. The existence of multiple equilibria doesn’t 
allow for any policy prescription. 
 
Figure 1 (Taken from HNO (2002)) – The speculative attack game. If at least a(Y) traders 
attack (choose option B), the attacking traders receive a payoff Y. Otherwise they get 0. If 
a trader does not attack (chooses option A), she gets T. 
 
2.2.2. Private information 
Morris and Shin (1998) assume that the fundamental state Y has a uniform distribution on a 
sufficiently large support. Traders get random private signals Xi, which distribution is uniform 
conditional and independent on [Y-ε,Y+ε], where ε is sufficiently small. Each trader expects 
the other traders to receive more or less high signals compared to theirs with an equal 
probability. Common knowledge of the fundamental state disappears: it is replaced by an 
equilibrium condition, such that agents compare the expected payoff of a successful attack, 
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weighted by the probability of success, to the transaction costs they have to pay with 
certainty. There exists a critical state of the economy below which an attack always occurs 
and above which an attack can never happen.  
Private information, by avoiding total coordination on a pure self-fulfilling equilibrium, thus 
leads to the determination of a potentially better situation than public information, in terms of 
economic stabilisation. We call this situation the Private Information game (PI). 
Heinemann and Illing (2002) show that more precise private information reduces the 
probability of a speculative attack. In order to minimise the probability of speculative attacks, 
the government should provide the agents with the best private information as possible but 
avoid common knowledge because of the danger of multiple equilibria.  
2.2.3. Public and private informational signals 
Between the two previous extreme cases (exclusive existence of public information or private 
information), Morris and Shin (1999) and Hellwig (2002) introduce private information and 
public information in the framework. The state Y of the economy is assumed to be normally 
distributed: Y~ N(Z,τ2). Public information is the prior mean Z and private information is 
given by Xi = Y + εi, εi ~ N(0, σ
2
). 
Morris and Shin (1999) show that under certain conditions about the precision of public and 
private signals, equilibrium uniqueness can be guaranteed: uniqueness requires that private 
information be sufficiently precise compared to public information. In other words, the 
equilibrium is unique as soon as the noise is relatively small. We call this situation the 
simultaneous private and common signals game (PCS). 
This framework changes the results in terms of policy implications compared to previous 
models. Morris and Shin (1999) find that the effects of private and public signals’ precision 
are at best ambiguous. Extending previous results, Metz (2002) shows that with both public 
and private signals there exists an interaction between the two types of information: public 
and private information can have opposite effects on the prior probability of a crisis, 
depending on the prior mean of fundamentals. In the case of a bad fundamental state of the 
economy, the more precise public information and the less precise private information, the 
higher is the probability of a speculative attack. On the contrary, in a situation of good 
fundamentals a higher precision of the public signal and a lower precision of the private 
signal lead to a reduction in the probability of crisis. 
Heinemann and Metz (2002) reconsider the problem of information disclosure when a central 
bank is threatened by a speculative attack on the fixed exchange rate by traders. Optimal risk 
and economic transparency are contingent to the prior probability of the expected mean of 
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fundamentals: each time the prior probability of the mean of economic performance is under a 
certain threshold, the central bank should engage itself on the maximal risk and diffuse 
private information with a maximal precision; for good prior expectations, to the opposite, the 
optimal policy requires that the central bank avoids any risk and disseminates private 
information with the lowest possible precision. This can be explained as follows. If agents 
anticipate that the state is bad, they are strongly inclined to attack the currency. The fact to 
have no information incites agents to attack the exchange rate regime: without private 
information, the threshold of attack would be high, even if the fundamental state was much 
better than the expected state; with private information, agents can suppose that the state 
could be better. The central bank must then commit itself to disclose private information: 
agents become aware of the good states and will avoid the attack, if there is effectively a good 
fundamental state. If the state were bad, they would attack anyway (it is not possible to avoid 
an attack in a situation of bad fundamentals). Conversely, if prior expectations are good (high 
expectations of non attack), agents avoid the attack; giving private information cannot 
ameliorate the state of things. It is thus preferable for the central bank not to disclose any 
private information on the posterior state of fundamentals. In other words, if the market 
considers that the economy is in fundamentally good state, the central bank should commit 
itself to a low precision of private information so as to reduce the probability of attack, 
because an attack would occur anyway in a bad fundamental state. 
Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) also study models with both public information and private 
information. According to them, "providing public information seems to be more convenient 
when fundamentals are “rather bad” than when fundamentals are “rather good”" (Sbracia 
and Zaghini, 2001, p. 19). The idea is the following: in a good state, with almost totally 
precise private information, there is no risk of attack; however, in bad states, with precise 
public information, multiple equilibria offer a chance to avoid attacks. 
Morris and Shin (2002) underline that one of the drawbacks of this previously mentioned 
global game literature is that the study of the role of public information (owing to 
comparative statics) is rendered difficult by the complex effect arising from the interrelation 
between better fundamental information and changes in strategic uncertainty. They thus 
propose a more simple beauty contest model that avoids such a drawback by giving 
equilibrium uniqueness for any parameter of the model. They are able to study the role of the 
precision of private and public signals on welfare. They show that the noise in the public 
signal is given more weight than the noise in the private signal, which reflects the 
coordination motive of the agents and the disproportionate influence of the public signal in 
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influencing the agents’ actions. In terms of welfare effects, they get the following result. 
While welfare is unambiguously increasing in the precision of the private signals, increased 
precision of public information is beneficial only when the agents’ private information is not 
very precise. Therefore, "when the private sector agents are already very well informed, the 
official sector would be well advised not to make public any more information, unless they 
could be confident that they can provide public information of very great precision" (Morris 
and Shin, 2002, p.19). The rationale for such a conclusion is that agents “overreact” to the 
public signal while suppressing the information content of the private signal. This underlines 
the importance of shared knowledge. 
After evoking theoretical predictions of speculative attack models under different 
informational assumptions, we turn to the description of the experimental design of the game. 
3. Experimental design 
There exists only one experimental study, which tests the global game approach applied to 
speculative attack, that of HNO (2002). This study brought to evidence the fact that there is 
no big difference in the treatments of public and private information by agents. This paper 
tries to take this result into account and to go beyond it by testing the model under different 
informational assumptions. 
3.1. The protocol of Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2002) 
HNO (2002) are the first to present an experiment that imitates a speculative attack model (à 
la Obstfeld (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998)). We present their protocol from which we 
draw our inspiration.  
They proceed to 25 sessions in total (in Germany and in Spain) with 345 participants (15 
participants per session). Each session includes two stages with 8 independent rounds per 
stage. In each round, subjects where submitted to 10 independent situations, in which they 
had to decide between two alternative choices (A or B). 
- Action A represents the risk-less choice, giving a positive and constant payoff T, which can 
be interpreted as the fact to avoid the costs linked to a speculative attack. It is a certain payoff. 
The two steps of each session were differentiated by the payoff linked to the choice A: in half 
of the sessions they started with T=20, then they took T=50 at the second stage; in the other 
sessions, they reversed the order. 
- Action B is the risky action and can be interpreted as the attack, giving a payoff Y, if the 
number of subjects choosing B exceeds a certain threshold a(Y)=15(80-Y)/W, and 0 otherwise 
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(the formula was given in the instructions, but also explained by an example and a table)
2
. 
Action B can thus give a positive payoff to the agent if a sufficient number of players chooses 
B (this payoff is a function of the number of attacking agents but also of the fundamental 
value), and 0 otherwise. 
More precisely, for each situation, the state Y is randomly selected from a uniform distribution 
on the interval [10,90]. In common information sessions, players precisely knew the value of 
Y and knew that everyone shared this information. In private information sessions, each agent 
received a private signal. Signals Xi were randomly selected from a uniform distribution on 
the interval [Y-10,Y+10] for each player separately; the received value was thus potentially 
different for each subject. Subjects knew that everyone of them only received private 
information and they shared the knowledge of the random process. 
The rules of the game including the structure of uncertainty were common information among 
the subjects of each session. The experiment avoided any connotation that might be associated 
with "speculation" or "attack": subjects were simply asked to choose between two actions A 
and B.  
3.2. The proposed protocol 
3.2.1. What is changed in our protocol? 
To be able to compare the results of our experiment to the results of HNO (2002), we drew a 
protocol as close as possible to theirs. So we only did slight modifications, which do not have 
any impact on the unfolding of the game. 
We firstly took the same number of players (15 players). Thresholds depend on the number of 
players, so we could keep the table giving the hurdle values. In addition, we kept the uniform 
distribution for convenience, although theoretical models use normally distributed signals. 
However, our values for Y were integers. 
Secondly, we added a phase where we asked participants questions about their understanding 
of the game, to avoid an education phase on the first rounds of the experiment. We asked 
simple questions which answers could be found in the instructions; they only proceeded when 
they answered correctly to the questions. To control for risk aversion of agents, we proposed a 
choice between the following alternative: a certain payoff of 2 euros and a lottery in which 
agents
3
 could earn 5 euros with probability ½ and nothing with probability ½.  
                                                 
2
 In 4 sessions, they applied W=100, in the others W=60. 
3
 In average, they were 10,5 out of 15 to choose the lottery. 
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Finally, we did only 6 sessions for each treatment. Consequently, we had to choose a fixed 
value for W (W=60). But in each session, we kept the two stages with T=20 and T=50. The 
main change concerns the two treatments that are envisaged in the new experiment. 
3.2.2. The representation of the new treatments in the protocol 
Sessions were run in Regate (rooms 1 and 2) at GATE laboratory (Lyon 2 University, CNRS, 
France), on the 29
th
 and 30
th
 of September and 1
st
 of October 2003. We announced our 
experiment by e-mail to students of our data base (who already participated to experiments in 
the lab, but not to a coordination game) and to most of the students of EM Lyon and to new 
students of Ecole Centrale Lyon. We also put some posters at various places in Lyon 2 
University and in ITECH. Most of the participants were business, economics or engineer 
undergraduates or graduates. During the three days, the procedure was kept the same 
throughout all sessions. All sessions were computerized, using a programme done with 
Regate (Zeiliger, 2000). Students were seated in a random order at PCs. Instructions were 
read aloud and questions were answered in private. Throughout the sessions students were not 
allowed to communicate and could not see others’ screens. 
We ran 6 sessions with two common signals (TCS) and 6 sessions with both private and 
common signals (PCS) (Table 1). Students could only participate once to the experiment. 
Number of sessions with Secure payoff T 
2 common signals Both (simultaneous) private and 
public signals 
1
st
 stage 20 / 2
nd
 stage 50 3 3 
1
st
 stage 50 / 2
nd
 stage 20 3 3 
Table 1 – Sessions overview. 
Analogously to HNO (2002), in each situation, the state Y was selected randomly with a 
uniform distribution on the interval [10,90] and was the same for all the agents. Our two 
treatments (simultaneous public and private information, and common multiple information) 
were constructed as follows: 
- in simultaneous noisy public and private information sessions, each subject received a 
private signal Xi randomly selected with a uniform distribution on the interval [Y-10,Y+10] 
and all the subjects received on top of that the same signal Z also randomly selected on [Y-
10,Y+10]; the private value Xi received by each agent was potentially different whereas the 
value Z was identical for every agent; everyone knew this structure and shared the knowledge 
of the random process. 
- in two public information sessions, all the agents received two common signals Z1 and Z2 
and knew that all participants received these two signals with certainty; each signal was 
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randomly selected with a uniform distribution on the interval [Y-10,Y+10] and everyone knew 
this structure and shared the knowledge of the random process. 
The presentation of the screen was very similar to HNO (2002). For each period, the secure 
payoff T was always shown on the top of the screen. The two left columns displayed the 
private and public signals (called respectively “private hint number” and “common hint 
number”) in the PCS condition or two public signals in the TCS condition (called “first 
common hint number” and “second common hint number”).  In the right column subjects had 
to decide between A and B by clicking at either of two boxes. There was no presetting. 
Decisions could be changed until subjects clicked on the OK-button at the lower end of the 
screen. Once all players had completed their decisions in one round, they were informed for 
each situation about their own private signal, the common signal in PCS sessions or about the 
two common signals in TCS sessions, about Y (true value), their choice, how many people 
had chosen B, whether the decision B was successful or not, their individual payoffs and the 
cumulative payoff over all 10 situations. After all players had left the information screen a 
new period started and information of previous periods could not be revised. Subjects were 
allowed to take notes and many of them did. 
At the beginning of each session, participants had to write in a questionnaire (via computer) 
their personal data and fill in 7 understanding questions. At the end of each session, they had 
to respond to 4 (quite open) questions on a distributed paper (so that they were free to give 
any comment regarding the experiment). Once completed the questionnaire, each person was 
paid in private converting his or her total points into euros. Average payment per subject was 
15 euros. Session length was around 1 hour and a half. The instructions are given in 
Appendix 8.1.  
Now, we evaluate the impact of those different informational contexts on the mechanism of 
agents’ coordination. 
4. Experimental evidence from the impact of the informational structure 
In this section, we examine the impact of the informational structure on the decision of 
agents, the probability of an attack, the predictability of an attack and the coordination of 
agents. But let’s first give some general considerations about subjects’ behaviour. 
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4.1. General considerations about subjects’ behaviour 
Before entering in the details of agents’ behaviour, it is important to mention that agents 
followed threshold strategies and tended to consider more the public signal than the private 
one under the PCS condition.  
4.1.1. The existence of threshold strategies 
Subjects used threshold strategies whereas those strategies were not imposed on the subjects. 
As HNO (2002, p.9), we call a subject’s behaviour "consistent with undominated thresholds" 
in some period, if her or his behaviour in that period was consistent with the existence of a 
threshold and did not exhibit any dominated actions. Accordingly, in TCS treatments, action 
B is dominated by A if Max {Z1 ; Z2}< T – ε and A is dominated by B if Min {Z1 ; Z2}> Y  – 
ε; in PCS treatments, action B is dominated by A if Max {X ; Z}< T – ε and A is dominated 
by B if Min {X ; Z}> Y  – ε. 
With several signals, it is not at first glance clear which definition of threshold strategy to 
choose: the mean of the signals, the lowest signal, the highest signal? As shown in Table 9 
(Appendix 8.2), subjects seemed to follow more threshold strategies as a mean of signals. A 
subject’s behaviour is consistent with a threshold strategy as a mean of signals, if the highest 
mean signals, for which the subject chose A, is smaller than the lowest mean signals at which 
he or she chose B. This definition of threshold as a mean of signals is theoretically relevant as 
subjects obtained two signals of equivalent precision. Irrespective of the treatments, most of 
the subjects followed a threshold strategy (in average more than 70% for the first round, and 
more than 89% for the last round); however, for some participants, learning had an impact to 
understand the advantage of playing threshold strategies. Hence, playing threshold strategies 
does not seem to require as strong assumptions as theory predicts (i.e. common knowledge of 
the game structure).  
4.1.2. The determinant signal for individual decision  
Inside a treatment, what determines the decision of agents? Does private information have an 
impact on the decision? To answer such a question, we use logistic regressions done on 
individual decision. Table 11 (in Appendix 8.3.2) shows that: 
- in PCS, the public signal plays a more important role in the decision taken by agents; 
- on the contrary, in TCS sessions, there is no clear use of one of the two public signals. 
Indeed, in 9 cases against 3, agents took more the public signal into account in the PCS 
treatment; whereas in 5 cases against 7, agents took more the first public signal than the 
second one into account in the TCS treatment. This means that agents tend to consider the 
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public signal as a focal point. Both the Binomial test and the Sign Test show that such a result 
is significant (p = 0.019 for the binomial test and p = 0.073 for the sign test). Moreover, this is 
confirmed by the comments written by participants
4
. 
As a consequence, the advantages and drawbacks of the potential for overreaction to public 
information have to be considered seriously by policy makers to determine how much they 
should disclose, in what form, and how often. As Morris and Shin (2002, p.4-5) put it: 
“Frequent and timely dissemination would aid the decision-making process by putting current 
information at the disposal of all economic agents, but this has to be set against the fact that 
provisional estimates are likely to be revised with the benefit of hindsight. By their nature, 
economic statistics are imperfect measurements of sometimes imprecise concepts, and no 
government agency or central bank can guarantee flawless information. This raises legitimate 
concerns about the publication of preliminary or incomplete data, since the benefit of early 
release may be more than outweighed by the disproportionate impact of any error”.  
In what follows, we try to catch the implications of this result and to find out whether it raises 
problems as feared by Morris and Shin (2002). 
4.2. Thresholds to successful attacks 
Not surprisingly, in all sessions, subjects tended to choose A for low signals or states and B 
for high signals or states. In consequence, the total number of players, who chose B, was 
rising with rising Y.  
Tables 2 and 3 give an indication of the states where action B was successful in different 
sessions. Similarly to HNO (2002, p.13-14), for each treatment, we give an interval: the 
smaller number is the highest state up to which action B always failed; the larger number is 
the state from which on action B was always successful. The midpoint of the interval 
measures how thresholds depend on exogenous conditions. The width of the interval gives a 
measure of predictability of attacks. This will be used to ask how the information condition 
influences predictability within a session. 
                                                 
4
 However, logistic estimations testing for the role of individual risk aversion on individual decision did not 
exhibit any significant result.  
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Sessions with two common signals Thresholds to success 
Session Order T = 20 T = 50 
30866249 20/50 41 – 44 56 – 61 
34622802 20/50 37 – 48 52 – 61 
49903521 20/50 45 – 48 54 – 55* 
27760776 50/20 26 – 32 30 – 57 
35768884 50/20 30 – 38 37 – 56 
50641587 50/20 25 – 32 26 – 56 
Table 2 – Thresholds to success in sessions with two common signals. A star indicates treatments where states 
with successful and failed attacks can be clearly divided. 
 
Sessions with private and common 
signals 
Thresholds to success 
Session Order T = 20 T = 50 
29520578 20/50 45 – 46* 52 – 55 
37461307 20/50 47 – 49* 57 – 59* 
28118404 20/50 46 – 51 47 – 59 
37831221 50/20 39 – 41* 54 – 57 
53026879 50/20 30 – 37 33 – 55 
53995310 50/20 32 – 36 54 – 58 
Table 3 – Thresholds to success in sessions with private and common signals. A star indicates treatments where 
states with successful and failed attacks can be clearly divided. 
 
In both sessions – and contrary to HNO (2002) –, most of the time we could not identify 
thresholds that clearly divided successful from failed attacks. There usually exists an overlap 
of states with successful and failed attacks. Random signals could deviate from the state by 10 
units on the Y-scale. As a consequence, success or failure of an attack at any given state is 
unpredictable even if all individual strategies are known. At low states an attack may occur 
just because many subjects got much higher signals or reverse. In addition, this feature might 
also be due to the fact that receiving several signals (two instead of one in HNO (2002)) 
perturbed participants in defining a clear threshold above which they attack and under which 
they do not attack. For sessions with PCS, the lack of total common information should have 
worsened this effect because it hinders subjects to coordinate on the same strategy. Those 
features are illustrated by Figures 2 and 3.  
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Figure 2 – Combined data from all eight periods of one stage of a session with two 
common signals. There are 80 Y-values selected in one stage. Dots indicate the 
associated number of subjects who chose B. The hurdle function is the minimal number 
of B-players needed for getting a reward while playing B. Dots below the hurdle function 
indicate states at which there was no successful attack. Dots on or above the hurdle 
indicate successful attacks. Two points indicate the highest state up to which action B 
always failed, and the lowest state from which on B was always successful. In this 
example, states with successful and failed attacks overlap, i.e. there are dots above and 
below the hurdle function within the interval defined by the two points already 
mentioned. 
Session 37831221 - PCS - Stage 1: T=50
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Figure 3 – Combined data from all eight periods of one stage of a session with both 
private and common signals. In this example, states with successful and failed attack 
also overlap. 
However, judging from Tables 2 and 3, subjects seem to have a bit more coordinated on 
thresholds that clearly divided successful from failed attacks in sessions with PCS. Perhaps, 
the existence of a single common signal helped participants to decide on a threshold by 
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serving as a focal point. This intuition is indeed confirmed by the analysis of probability and 
predictability of attacks and coordination. 
 
4.3. Probability and Predictability of Attacks 
To answer the question whether public information raises or lowers the probability on the one 
hand and the predictability of an attack on the other, we compare the characteristics of the 
states of successful and failed attacks in PCS and TCS treatments using aggregate behaviour 
analysis first and individual behaviour analysis afterwards. 
4.3.1. Aggregate behaviour analysis 
Table 4 contains a statistic of midpoints of the intervals of indeterminacy as a measure of 
thresholds to success. In addition, it gives the average width of the intervals of indeterminacy 
(i.e. between the highest state, up to which on action B always failed and the lowest state, 
from which on action B was always successful) that will be used as a measure of 
predictability of an attack. 
Treatment T = 20 T = 50 
Sessions with TCS   
Mean thresholds to success 36.37 54.88 
Standard deviation 7.0 6.7 
Average width of the interval of indeterminacy 6.33 15.17 
(Number of sessions) (6) (6) 
Sessions with PCS   
Mean thresholds to success 41.33 56.36 
Standard deviation 6.2 4.5 
Average width of the interval of indeterminacy 3.5 7.67 
(Number of sessions) (6) (6) 
Table 4 – Observed mean thresholds to success and average width of the interval between the highest state, up to 
which action B always failed and the lowest state, from which on action B was always successful. 
The mean threshold to success is always higher in simultaneous private and public signals 
than in otherwise equal treatments with two common signals. The standard deviation is 
however larger in the TCS than in the PCS condition. Those results can be explained by the 
fact that, in the PCS condition, the existence of a single public signal served as a focal point, 
whereas in the TCS treatment there could be confusion in focal points (the first common hint, 
the second one or the mean of these two values).  
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Probability of successful attack 
The higher the threshold to success, the smaller is ex ante probability for states, at which 
subjects succeed to play B. This is interpreted as a lower prior probability for speculative 
attacks that enforce devaluation.  
For a systematic analysis of the influence of information and other control variables on mean 
thresholds we use linear regressions. We determine whether threshold states Y
*
 from which on 
an attack is likely to occur depends on various exogenous conditions or not. Regression 4 
shows that T explains 67% of all data variation; Regression 5 shows that information and 
order of treatment increase this to 92% (see Table 13, Appendix 8.3.3). However, the number 
of risk adverse subjects has no significant impact on the determination of the threshold level 
(Regression 8).  
From this analysis, we can deduce that information has a significant impact on the level of the 
threshold. However, order has a stronger influence. Like in HNO (2002), surprisingly, 
thresholds tend to be higher in sessions where we started with a low payoff for the secure 
action (T=20) than in sessions where we started with a high payoff (T=50). Therefore 
something irrelevant (as the order in which participants are asked to play) can have a greater 
impact on the probability of attack than some other obviously relevant element (information). 
This can explain for example that there has sometimes been an attack at a moment where 
news was irrelevant to it. In some sense, attacks are not really predictable (or have at least a 
probability of occurrence which can vary according to irrelevant news). 
Predictability of attacks 
We now consider whether there is any difference in predictability of thresholds related to the 
information condition. 
Firstly, comparing the standard deviations of average thresholds in previous Table 4 above, it 
seems that the information condition has an impact on the dispersion of observed thresholds 
among otherwise equal treatments. This impression is supported by separate regressions of 
thresholds for both information conditions. Indeed, regressions 6 and 7 (see Table 13, 
Appendix 8.3.3) show that there is a small difference between TCS and PCS conditions. 
Moreover, the standard variation of residuals is 6.21 in sessions with TCS and 7.52 in 
sessions with PCS. Thus, we clearly see that this interval is larger with PCS than with TCS.  
Secondly, the differences in the predictability within a session can also be measured by the 
width of the interval between the highest state up to which action B always failed and the 
lowest state from which on action B was always successful (see Table 4 above). These 
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intervals tend to be wider for TCS. We check whether the difference between the lowest state, 
from which on all attacks succeeded, and the highest state, up to which all attacks failed, has 
any relation to exogenous conditions. On average over all sessions with TCS the intervals of 
states for which there is no clear indication of whether attacks fail or succeed has width 12. In 
treatments with both private and public signals, its width is 7.1 on average. This result is quite 
different from HNO (2002, p.17) for whom “private information increases the range of states 
for which we cannot predict whether an attack is successful or not”. Regressions 11 and 12 
(see Table 14, Appendix 8.3.3) show that the difference in information conditions is hardly 
significant (around 10%-level). This would mean that with TCS the range of states for which 
a state falls into the region of indeterminacy increases by 4.9 compared to PCS. This 
difference in results (compared to HNO) might be explained by the fact that the single 
common signal serves as a coordination point, similarly to CI treatments in HNO (2002) (see 
section 5. below).  
4.3.2. Individual behaviour analysis 
Previous aggregate results are confirmed by the analysis of individual behaviour. We use a 
logistic regression done on individual decision
5
. We estimate for each session the proportion 
of agents who are choosing B (which is an increasing function in signals) by a logistic 
estimation
6
; thus the mean of this function gives us an estimation of the probability of crisis 
and its variance represents a measure of predictability of crisis. 
We estimate the distribution of thresholds for each round of each session using a logistic 
estimation; results may be interpreted in two ways:  
- as estimated probabilities for subjects choosing B conditional on hints Z1 and Z2 or hints X 
and Z, respectively,  
- as estimated distribution of individual thresholds.  
Table 12 in Appendix 8.3.2 gives statistical information on session specific results. Table 5 
gives a summary statistic of estimated means and estimated standard deviations of individual 
thresholds for distinguished treatments. 
 
                                                 
5
 Because of problems of complete data separation, we could not directly use the (aggregate) probability of 
success in our logistic estimation. 
6
 The logistic distribution is more appropriate than the normal distribution, because we observe “fat tails” due to 
irrational behaviour of a few subjects who do not play threshold strategies. 
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Treatment T = 20 T = 50 
Sessions with TCS   
Average estimated mean of individual thresholds 34.07 54.49 
Average estimated standard deviation 9.95 6.82 
Number of sessions (6) (6) 
Sessions with PCS   
Average estimated mean of individual thresholds 39.46 57.40 
Average estimated standard deviation 11.04 9.86 
Number of sessions (6) (6) 
Table 5 – Average estimated means and standard deviations of individual thresholds to action B. 
 
Probability of successful attack 
It clearly appears that the estimated probability of successful attack is always smaller in the 
PCS treatment. To check such a conclusion, we run a linear regression using the controlled 
variables to explain the estimated mean threshold of each session (see Regression 16, in Table 
15, Appendix 8.3.3). This reinforces previous results according to which the informational 
structure has a significant impact on the probability of attack even if this impact is smaller 
than that of “irrelevant” variables (such as the order), implying that speculators can overreact 
to irrelevant news (and thus coordinate on “sunspots”). 
Predictability of attacks 
Table 5 tends to show the exact opposite of what was found earlier: the average estimated 
standard deviation is always larger in the PCS case. However, the linear regression 17 (see 
Table 15, Appendix 8.3.3) using controlled variables to explain standard deviations of 
individual thresholds shows that such a result is not significant at all. 
As a consequence, in terms of economic policy, we can draw the following conclusion from 
our previous results. The central bank can reduce the probability of an attack and has more 
control on the beliefs of traders if it discloses one clear (and precise) single signal, even if 
agents get private information from other sources. By giving several public signals, it lowers 
its focal potential. The loss of predictability linked to uncontrolled private information is 
largely outweighed by the increase of predictability related to the existence of a focal point. 
What is the impact of the existence of such a focal point on coordination failures? 
4.4. Coordination Failures 
We now turn to the analysis of coordination in function of the informational structure given to 
participants. The objective of this section is to study the impact of public information vs. 
private information in PCS sessions on coordination (while testing at the same time whether a 
first public signal has more impact than a second one in TCS sessions). We first give an 
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overview on coordination before measuring it as well as determining efficiency and welfare 
losses. 
4.4.1. An overlook on coordination 
We establish some very general results about the impact of the treatments on coordination. To 
start with, we establish the impact of the treatment on extreme situations: perfect coordination 
vs. total coordination failure. We define perfect coordination as the situation in which all 
agents chose the same action and total coordination failure as the situation in which only half 
of the subjects (7 or 8) play the same action. Table 6 gives the respective percentages of 
occurrence of these situations. 
                                Coordination 
Information 
Perfect Coordination Total coordination failure 
PCS 51.6% 1.73% 
TCS 57.3% 1% 
TCS with Z1=Z2  
(36 cases out of 960) 
50% 0% 
Table 6 – Percentage of situations in which all subjects played the same action (perfect coordination) and in 
which 8 or 7 played the same action (total coordination failure) in function of the informational structure they 
had. 
 
It appears that perfect coordination is better achieved in TCS than in PCS sessions and total 
coordination failure happens more in PCS than in TCS sessions. This very approximate 
estimation of coordination is confirmed by all the intermediate values for coordination.  
We also address the question whether, when Z1 = Z2 in TCS, the number of attacking agents 
increases or not (so that it increases coordination). Such a situation takes place in 36 cases out 
of 960 and seems to have a negative impact on coordination: in such a case, subjects receive a 
less precise indication on the true state (very different hints give them a better idea of the 
fundamental state), which may hinder coordination or make it more difficult. This result is 
very much in line with the theory: subjects seem to make bayesien update. On the other hand, 
there is confusion about on which common signal to coordinate. Empirically, we could have 
expected that the fact to receive two identical signals could have reinforced agents in the idea 
that this value, as repeated, was the true value; indeed the estimation of the fundamental could 
have been psychologically counterintuitive.  
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However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample two-tailed test (on all the cumulated 
intermediate values for coordination – between perfect coordination and total coordination 
failures) shows that we can reject such a hypothesis with a very high degree of significance: 
there is no significant difference linked to the informational structure on coordination 
achievement. Such a result is confirmed by a more systematic measure of coordination. 
4.3.2. A measure of coordination 
To measure coordination (while distinguishing between its effect and the level of threshold), 
we calculate the number of regrettable decisions. According to HNO (2002, p.18), when 
individual behaviour is not perfectly coordinated, subjects experience mistakes in the 
information phase and learn to adjust their thresholds toward each other. There are two 
possible situations in which a subject could regret her decision: 
- she chose B and received 0 (a failed attack), 
- she chose A, when B would have given a higher reward (a missed opportunity to attack). 
These situations should not occur when a subject can predict whether an attack will be 
successful or not. The total number of cases where subjects could regret their decisions gives 
us a measure for their ability to predict whether an attack will be successful or not.  
Figure 4 shows the average number of decisions where a subject could have improved her 
payoff by deciding differently. If the number of regrettable decision is not particularly high 
(except in the first three periods), there are more regrettable decisions with PCS than with 
TCS. However this difference is not striking and the figure does not show a clear trend over 
time
7
. 
The analysis of coordination measured with the number of regrettable decisions shows that 
there is no overreaction to the focal public signal in the PCS treatment. Indeed, the presence 
of private information compensates the potential disproportionate outweigh associated with 
public information (that can be mistaken). Thus private information has a stabilising effect, as 
suggested by global game models: while sunspots can occur under TCS condition because of 
self-fulfilling beliefs, those are avoided by private information in the PCS case. 
                                                 
7
 Note that the change of treatment in period 9 strongly increased the number of regrets. 
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Figure 4 – Average number of situations in which a subject could have achieved a higher 
payoff by a different decision. 
 
4.5. Efficiency and welfare losses 
We test welfare effects of coordination failures (how a better coordination on a better 
equilibrium could have increased welfare – for speculators but not for the central bank as its 
utility function is not modelled here). To this aim, we compare the maximum value in ECU 
that subjects could have obtained to what they got in reality.  
As expected, welfare losses were the highest for values of Y close to T and the lowest for 
extreme values of Y. Indeed, coordination is mainly problematic for critical, intermediate 
values of Y. The zone of Y for which welfare losses are high is larger in PCS than TCS 
treatments. Moreover, these welfare losses were higher in PCS than TCS, as the analysis in 
terms of coordination could predict it. 
The rationale for such a result can be found owing to previous conclusions about the focal 
role of the public signal in the PCS treatment. Focusing on the public signal – and ignoring 
the private one –, subjects receive less precise signals in the case of PCS sessions than in the 
case of TCS sessions where they consider both. Therefore, they had a better hint about the 
true value of Y in the TCS case. Welfare losses for speculators were thus accentuated in PCS 
treatments. The public signal serves as a focal point for the beliefs of the group as a whole, 
but here it also conveys less precise information on the underlying fundamentals than the two 
public signals in the TCS sessions. The precision of signals thus plays an important role. 
Individual speculators’ welfare is increased by an increased precision in the disclosed signals. 
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Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 illustrate this feature by representing effective welfare losses in 
percentage of the maximum gains in function of the true fundamental state for each session. 
The value of Y for which welfare losses are the highest are really stable across sessions and 
relatively higher when T = 20. 
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Figure 5 – Average percentage of welfare losses in ECU in function of Y for the last 4 
rounds in PCS sessions which order is T=20 and then T=50 and for which T=50. 
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Figure 6 – Average percentage of welfare losses in ECU in function of Y for the last 4 
rounds in TCS sessions which order is T=20 and then T=50 and for which T=50. 
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Figure 7 – Average percentage of welfare losses in ECU in function of Y for the last 4 
rounds in PCS sessions which order is T=20 and then T=50 and for which T=20. 
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Figure 8 – Average percentage of welfare losses in ECU in function of Y for the last 4 
rounds in TCS sessions which order is T=20 and then T=50 and for which T=20. 
5. Comparison of the results with previous experiments 
In this section, we propose to compare our experimental results to the previous experiment 
done by HNO (2002). To make such a comparison, we take in HNO (2002) only the sessions 
with W = 60. This comparison aims at better understanding the coordinating effect of public 
information and its potential drawbacks linked to self-fulfilling beliefs. Nevertheless, the 
following results have to be taken into account with caution because even if this experiment 
was a close as possible to the protocol of HNO, we already mentioned some differences. 
More especially, coordination games are very sensible to different subjects’ pools. 
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We compare first the probability of attack, then the predictability of attack and finally the 
coordination failures in each informational context. Table 7 recapitulates the different 
elements of comparison between both experiments, on which we base our analysis. 
Probability of Attack 
(Thresholds’ value) 
Predictability of 
Attack 
(Thresholds’ 
dispersion) 
 
Informational structure/ 
Average Results 
T=20 T=50 T=20 T=50 
Size of 
Coordination 
Failures 
CI 40.47 52.78 4.5 2.2 0.59 
PI 
Treated by HNO (2002) 
44.16 54.74 4.0 2.8 1.19 
TCS  36.37 54.88 7.0 6.7 0.67 
PCS 
New treatments 
41.33 56.36 6.2 4.5 0.87 
Table 7 – Recapitulative comparison of the results of our experiment to the results of HNO (only sessions with 
W=60). 
 
5.1. Probability of attack 
There is no clear evidence of the treatment that lowers (respectively highers) the probability 
of attack. Indeed, results are different depending on the value of T. 
However, our analysis confirms the results of HNO (2002): comparing treatments with T=20 
with otherwise equal treatments with T=50, the threshold clearly rises in T; this means that 
opportunity costs of an attack reduce the probability of devaluation. In other words, capital 
controls reduce the probability of successful attacks. 
 
5.2. Predictability of attack 
Decentralised information (i.e. several sources of information or several signals) tends to 
reduce the predictability of attacks. Indeed for both values of T, in the new proposed 
treatments, thresholds’ dispersion is always much higher (around 6 in average) than in 
treatments treated by HNO (2002) (around 3 in average). As already mentioned, this result is 
even stronger for TCS treatments, probably because of the same public nature of both signals. 
5.3. Coordination failures 
Table 7 shows that having only one public (and unmistaken) signal favours coordination. The 
existence of several focal points (several public signals) perturbed coordination. The presence 
of public information (in sessions with both types of signals compared to PI conditions) 
clearly shows the coordinating effect of the public nature of signals. Coordination failures are 
the most numerous in private information sessions. The rationale for such a result is rather 
intuitive. 
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However, the comparison is plagued by the fact that the number of regrettable decisions 
comprehends on top of the measure of coordination a measure of signals’ precision. Yet, the 
precision of the common information treatment is perfect whereas the other informational 
structures are of imperfect precision. 
6. Conclusion 
The following table sums up the main results of this paper in comparing empirical evidence to 
theoretical predictions in terms of informational disclosure policy. 
The main economic policy conclusion we can draw from our experiment is the following. The 
central bank can reduce the prior probability of a crisis and higher its focal potential if it 
discloses a single signal, in a context where agents additionally get private information from 
diverse sources. 
An interesting extension of our research would be to experimentally analyse more closely the 
evidence of informational precision on subjects’ decisions. 
Basic 
framework 
Theoretical predictions  Empirical evidence 
 
Results of  HNO (2002) 
 
One public 
signal  
(Obstfeld, 1996) 
Destabilisation: 
The public signal is a focal point but can 
provoke an overreaction of agents. 
 
- Probability: higher than one private signal 
treatment. 
- Predictability: high. 
- Coordination: always better achieved. 
 
One private 
signal 
(Morris and 
Shin, 1998) 
 
Stabilisation if private information precise 
enough: 
The presence of private information leads to 
higher order beliefs, which prevent from 
overreaction of agents to any signal. 
 
- Probability: relatively low. 
- Predictability: high. 
- Coordination: the least efficient. 
 
 
Our experimental results 
 
 
Two common 
signals 
Same as having a noisy public signal 
Destabilisation:  
There is a potential damage linked to the 
noise in public information. 
- Probability: no significant difference 
compared to other situations, but higher than 
PCS. 
- Predictability: low (the worst). 
- Coordination: good but less efficient than in 
CI sessions 
 
One public 
signal and one 
private signal  
(Morris and 
Shin, 2002) 
Stabilisation if private information precise 
enough compared to public information: 
The public signal serves as a focal point 
while at the same time the presence of 
private information avoids agents’ 
overreaction. 
- Probability: no significant difference 
compared to all other situations, but lower 
than TCS. 
- Predictability: low, but better than TCS. 
- Coordination: coordination is better 
achieved on the public signal. 
Table 8 – Synthesis of empirics vs. theoretical predictions in terms of informational disclosure policy. 
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8. Appendices 
8.1. Instructions according to the different informational treatments 
Instructions to participants varied according to the different treatments. We present the 
instructions for a session with simultaneous public and private information (with T=20 in full 
length, for the other sessions instructions were adapted accordingly). The instructions for two 
common signals treatments were adapted and are available upon request
8
. 
General information 
Thank you for your participation to an economic experiment, in which you have the chance to 
earn money. We ask you not to communicate from now on. If you have a question, then raise 
your hand, and one of the instructors will come to you. 
You are one of 15 persons, who interact with another. The rules are the same for all 
participants. The experiment consists of 2 stages with 8 independent rounds in each stage. In 
each round you will receive 10 independent situations, in each of which you have to make a 
decision (A or B). 
Rules of the first stage (the two stages differ only by the payoff for decision A): 
Decision situation: 
For each situation a number called Y is drawn randomly from the interval 10 to 90. This 
number is the same for all participants. All numbers in the interval [10, 90] have the same 
probability to be drawn. When you make your decision, you will not know the drawn number 
Y. 
However, you will be receiving two types of information on Y: 
- Each participant will receive a private hint number X for the unknown number Y. This 
private hint number X is randomly selected from the interval [Y-10, Y+10]. All numbers in 
this interval have the same probability to be drawn. Private hint numbers of different 
participants are drawn independently from the same interval. Each private hint number is thus 
potentially different for each participant.  
- All participants will receive, on top of that private hint number X, a common hint number Z 
for the unknown number Y.  This common hint number is randomly selected from the interval 
[Y-10, Y+10]. This common hint number Z is thus the same for every participant. 
On basis of these hint numbers X and Z you can decide in each situation between two 
different decisions: A or B. 
If you decide for A, then an amount of 20 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) is credited to 
your account. This amount is the same for all rounds of the first stage and for all participants 
(in the second stage the amount is raised to 50 ECU). 
If you decide for B, then your payoff depends on how many participants select the same 
decision B and also depends on how large is the unknown number Y. Decision B is the more 
successful, the more participants decide for B and the larger the number Y is. If the number of 
participants who decide for B is at least 20-Y/4, then each participant, who decided for B, 
receives the amount of Y ECU. A more exact explanation of this formula is given with the 
help of an example and the table at the end of the instructions. If fewer participants decided 
for B, then those choosing B receive zero ECU.  
Once all participants made their 10 decisions for the 10 games, a round is terminated. 
(Remember there are 8 rounds in each of the two stages). 
                                                 
8
 Here is a translation (from French to English) of the instructions given to the participants.  
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Information after each round 
Each participant will be informed after each round for each of the 10 games on 
(1) the number Y, 
(2) how many participants decided for A or B, 
(3) the own payoff and also the total sum of the own payoffs over all 10 games. 
 
Example: 
The number of participants is 15. The payoff for A is always 20. The unknown number Y, 
which was drawn, is 48. 
The private hint numbers X drawn for each of the fifteen participants are: 38, 45, 42, 56, etc. 
The common hint number Z drawn for the fifteen participants is: 52. 
Every participant knows with the common hint number Z = 52 that Y is between 42 and 62. 
So: 
- the participant with his private hint number X = 38 knows, on top of that, that Y is between 
28 and 48; from which he can deduce that Y is between 42 and 48; 
- the participant with his private hint number X = 45 knows, on top of that, that Y is between 
35 and 55; from which he can deduce that Y is between 42 and 55. 
- etc. 
Six participants decide for A, nine participants decide for B. 
The participants, who chose A, receive 20 ECU. 
In order to receive a positive payoff for B, at least 20-48/4 = 8 (remember the formula (20-
Y/4)) participants have to decide for B (that is 8 or more). Since 9 participants selected B, 
each of them receives Y = 48. 
For the calculation of the minimum number of the participants needed such that payoff for B 
is positive see attached table: 
Since Y = 48, the number of participants must be 8 in order to get a positive payoff for 
decision B. 
Note: You don't know the true value of Y, but you receive two hint numbers, which are 
approximations of Y. Therefore you cannot exactly determine how many players must select 
B, in order to get a positive payoff. 
 
For the calculation of the minimum number of participant’s who have to choose B in 
order to get a positive payoff for B: 
Participants, who choose B, receive a positive payoff, only if at least 20-Y/4 participants 
choose B. 
In the right hand column you find the minimal number of participants and in the left column 
the according intervals for Y. 
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If the unknown number Y is in the interval, 
(Note: Y is between 10 and 90) 
Then at least … of the 15 participants 
(including yourself) have to select B, in order 
to get a positive payoff 
10 to 23 15 
24 to 27 14 
28 to 31 13 
32 to 35 12 
36 to 39 11 
40 to 43 10 
44 to 47 9 
48 to 51 8 
52 to 55 7 
56 to 59 6 
60 to 63 5 
64 to 67 4 
68 to 71 3 
72 to 75 2 
76 to 90 1 
 
Instructions for PC: 
Each round is divided into a decision phase and into an information phase. During the 
decision phase the screen shows the current round in the heading line. The second line 
informs you about the sure payoff for decision A. The following table shows your private 
hind number X and the common hint number Z of everybody for each game in the left 
column. In the right column you must click which decision you want to select. Once you 
decided for all 10 games, you must press the OK button. As long as you have not pressed the 
red button, you can still modify your decisions. When exceeding the time limit you are 
reminded to make your decisions. 
When all participants have pressed the OK-button, the decision phase of a round is terminated 
and the information phase begins. The display in the information phase indicates line by line 
for each situation of this round the true value Y, the number of players, who decided for B, 
your own decision, and the change of your account balance. After the time limit the next 
round starts. In addition you can leave the information phase beforehand through the OK 
button. After leaving the information screen you have no more possibility to inform yourself 
about passed decisions. 
 
Questionnaire: 
At the end of the experiment (after the second stage) we ask you to fill out a questionnaire. 
The personal data asked for are treated strictly confidential and used for research purposes 
only. 
 
Payoffs: 
Also at the end of the experiment the ECUs you have obtained are converted into Euros and 
paid in cash. 1 ECU corresponds to 0.166 Cents, so that 1000 ECU are converted to 1.66 
Euro. 
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8.2. Threshold strategies 
We examine the average number of subjects, whose behavior is consistent with an 
undominated threshold strategy for both treatments. The next table sums up the average 
number of subjects who played a threshold strategy, which was consistent with an 
undominated threshold strategy defined according to the five criteria: the mean of the two 
signals, the highest signal or the lowest signal. 
 
Information PCS TCS 
No. of sessions 6 6 
Definition of threshold mean high low mean high low 
R1 10.50 10.00 8.50 12.50 12.34 12.50 
R2 12.84 11.00 12.33 12.33 10.67 12.00 
R3 12.34 11.83 10.33 13.00 12.66 13.00 
R4 13.00 13.00 11.83 11.67 12.50 10.00 
R5 12.83 13.00 11.66 13.83 13.84 13.84 
R6 13.50 11.83 12.83 14.33 14.33 14.16 
R7 12.83 13.16 11.83 13.33 12.66 11.67 
R8 14.00 14.00 13.33 12.83 12.00 12.83 
R9 13.66 13.66 13.34 13.16 12.83 12.34 
R10 14.17 13.00 13.83 14.17 13.83 10.34 
R11 14.00 14.00 13.50 14.16 14.00 14.33 
R12 13.84 13.66 13.16 14.50 14.50 13.00 
R13 14.33 13.34 14.16 11.83 12.83 11.50 
R14 13.84 14.00 13.50 14.17 12.66 13.16 
R15 14.00 13.00 13.00 14.50 14.67 12.50 
R16 14.16 13.50 13.67 14.84 14.84 13.66 
Average 13.36 12.90 12.55 13.46 13.20 12.57 
Table 9 – Comparison of average thresholds according to the different methods of thresholds’ calculations. 
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8.3. Logistic estimations and linear regressions 
8.3.1. Variables used in linear regressions and logistic estimation 
The next table explains the variables used for linear regressions and logistic estimation. 
 
Name 
 
 
Nature 
 
 
Definition 
T 
 
 
dummy 0: payoff for secure action T=20 1: T=50 
Info(rmation) 
 
 
dummy 0: session with 2 common signals 1: session with simultaneous 
private and common signals 
Ord(er) 
 
dummy 0: session starting with T=50 1: session starting with T=20 
TO 
 
dummy 0: if Order = 0 or T = 20 1: if Order = 1 and T=50 
Pr (Private signal)  
 
number Value of the private signal in PCS sessions. 
Pu (Public signal) 
 
number Value of the common signal in PCS sessions. 
Pu 1 (first public signal) 
 
number Value of the first common hint in TCS sessions. 
Pu 2 (second public 
signal) 
 
number Value of the second common hint in TCS sessions. 
H (highest signal) 
 
number Value of the highest signal in both treatments. 
L (lowest signal) 
 
number Value of the lowest signal in both treatments. 
Ri(sk) 
 
 
number Number of agents who are not risk averse (either risk lover or risk 
neutral) in a session. 
De(cision) 
 
 
dummy 0: if the participant chose decision 
A 
1: if the participant chose decision 
B 
TS 
 
 
number Average (per session) number of subjects whose behaviour is consistent 
with an undominated threshold strategy 
Y
*
 
 
 
number Mean between highest state up to which all attacks failed and lowest state 
from which on all attacks succeeded in all 8 periods 
∆Y* 
 
number Distance between the two states defining Y
*
 
a number Results from logistic estimation 
b number Results from logistic estimation 
c number Results from logistic estimation 
Mean number (a/(b+c)) = estimated mean threshold 
Variance number 
(pi/( 3 (b+c))) = estimated variance of thresholds 
Table 10 – Variables used in linear regressions and logistic estimations. 
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8.3.2. Logistic estimation 
We use the following logit model: 
(De)
1
(De)
1
P
e−
=
+
 
where De = 1 if the participant chose decision B and 0 if the participant chose decision A. We 
assume that De is linearly related to the variables explained in the two cases below. 
Dei = a + b Pr + c Pu + u  for PCS sessions 
or Dei = a + b Pu1 + c Pu2 + u  for TCS sessions 
where u is the error. 
The results of the logistic estimation are summed up in Table 11. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Parameter estimation Session Infor- 
mation 
Order T 
a b c 
30866249 TCS 20/50 20 9.12 0.13 0.08 
30866249 TCS 20/50 50 25.03 0.16 0.28 
34622802 TCS 20/50 20 3.30 0.01 0.08 
34622802 TCS 20/50 50 11.51 0.10 0.11 
49903521 TCS 20/50 20 7.61 0.09 0.08 
49903521 TCS 20/50 50 20.96 0.19 0.20 
27760776 TCS 50/20 20 19.02 0.34 0.39 
27760776 TCS 50/20 50 13.73 0.14 0.12 
35768884 TCS 50/20 20 3.28 0.08 0.02 
35768884 TCS 50/20 50 6.81 0.05 0.07 
50641587 TCS 50/20 20 11.62 0.24 0.21 
50641587 TCS 50/20 50 11.03 0.07 0.14 
29520578 PCS 20/50 20 10.24 0.12 0.11 
29520578 PCS 20/50 50 20.80 0.16 0.21 
28118404 PCS 20/50 20 6.70 0.08 0.06 
28118404 PCS 20/50 50 7.07 0.05 0.07 
37461307 PCS 20/50 20 5.37 0.04 0.07 
37461307 PCS 20/50 50 20.72 0.19 0.17 
37831221 PCS 50/20 20 3.38 0.04 0.06 
37831221 PCS 50/20 50 5.20 0.04 0.05 
53026879 PCS 50/20 20 10.81 0.16 0.21 
53026879 PCS 50/20 50 13.72 0.12 0.13 
53995310 PCS 50/20 20 10.10 0.12 0.19 
53995310 PCS 50/20 50 15.95 0.12 0.15 
Table 11 – The first row is the session number. The next two rows give session specific conditions. Row 4 
indicates the treatment specific payoff to action A. Rows 5, 6, and 7 are results of logistic regressions based on 
data of the last four periods of each treatment. 
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Owing to the data of Table 11, we calculate the estimated mean and standard deviation of 
individual thresholds. The results are summed up in Table 12. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Esti- 
mated mean 
Esti- 
mated standard 
deviation 
Session Infor- 
mation 
Order T Average 
number of 
“ratio- 
-nal” 
subjects
9
 
 
a/(b+c) ( )3 b c
pi
+
 
30866249 TCS 20/50 20 13.37 43.43 8.64 
30866249 TCS 20/50 50 14.87 56.88 4.12 
34622802 TCS 20/50 20 12.50 36.67 20.15 
34622802 TCS 20/50 50 13.12 54.81 8.64 
49903521 TCS 20/50 20 13.12 42.28 10.08 
49903521 TCS 20/50 50 14.12 53.74 4.65 
27760776 TCS 50/20 20 14.00 26.05 2.48 
27760776 TCS 50/20 50 12.62 52.81 6.98 
35768884 TCS 50/20 20 13.87 32.80 18.14 
35768884 TCS 50/20 50 13.00 56.75 15.11 
50641587 TCS 50/20 20 13.50 23.23 0.22 
50641587 TCS 50/20 50 13.25 51.96 1.44 
29520578 PCS 20/50 20 12.37 44.52 7.89 
29520578 PCS 20/50 50 14.62 56.22 4.90 
28118404 PCS 20/50 20 12.50 47.85 12.96 
28118404 PCS 20/50 50 13.00 58.92 15.11 
37461307 PCS 20/50 20 12.25 48.82 16.49 
37461307 PCS 20/50 50 14.37 57.56 5.04 
37831221 PCS 50/20 20 12.75 33.80 18.14 
37831221 PCS 50/20 50 11.62 57.78 20.15 
53026879 PCS 50/20 20 14.87 29.22 4.90 
53026879 PCS 50/20 50 13.75 54.88 7.26 
53995310 PCS 50/20 20 14.37 32.58 5.85 
53995310 PCS 50/20 50 13.87 59.07 6.72 
Table 12 – The first row is the session number. The next two rows give session specific conditions. Row 4 
indicates the treatment specific payoff to action A. Row 5 gives the average number of subjects per period, 
whose behavior was consistent with undominated threshold strategies. Rows 6 shows the estimated mean of 
individual thresholds and row 7 the standard deviation of individual thresholds, calculated from estimates a, b 
and c in the previous table. 
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 We define as “rational” behaviour any agent’s behaviour, which is consistent with undominated threshold 
strategy defined by the mean of signals.  
 35
8.3.3. Linear regressions 
For all the linear regressions, we give the coefficient of the explanatory variable and in 
bracket the t-statistic. 
 
Table 13 sums up the results from regressions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, which determine the 
influence of the different explaining variables on the level of threshold. 
Regression 4: Y
*
 = γ0 + γ1 T + u . 
Regression 5: Y
*
 = γ0 + γ1 T + γ2  Info + γ3 Ord + γ4 TO + u . 
Regressions 6-7: Y
*
 = γ0 + γ1 T + γ3 Ord + γ4 TO + u . 
Regression 8: Y
*
 = γ0 + γ1 Ri + u . 
Regressions 9-10: Y
*
 = γ0 + γ1 T + γ2 Ri + γ3 Ord + γ4 TO + u . 
Explaining variables: estimated coefficients 
(t-values) 
R2 
 
Adjusted R2 
No. Data source 
(number of 
observations) 
Intercept T Info Ord TO Ri  
4 39.23 
(22.80) 
16.38 
(6.73) 
    0.67 
0.66 
5 
All treatments 
(24) 
30.96 
(21.90) 
21.57 
(12.06) 
3.59 
(2.84) 
12.94 
(7.23) 
-10.37 
(-4.10) 
 0.92 
0.91 
6 Treatments with 
PCI  
(12) 
35.58 
(25.50) 
20.00 
(10.13) 
 13.04 
(6.61) 
-11.53 
(-4.13) 
 0.95 
0.93 
7 Treatments with 
2CS (12) 
29.94 
(14.36) 
23.15 
(7.85) 
 12.83 
(4.35) 
-9.21 
(-2.21) 
 0.92 
0.90 
8 All treatments 
(24) 
47.15 
(4.27) 
    0.03 
(0.02) 
0.00 
-0.04 
9 Treatments with 
PCI  
(12) 
34.44 
(8.10) 
20.00 
(9.54) 
 13.07 
(6.22) 
-11.54 
(-3.89) 
0.10 
(0.29) 
0.95 
0.92 
10 Treatments with 
2CS (12) 
38.33 
(6.90) 
23.15 
(8.60) 
 13.12 
(4.86) 
-9.21 
(-2.42) 
-0.87 
(-1.61) 
0.95 
0.91 
Table 13 – Regressions explaining thresholds to success. 
 
 
Table 14 sums up the results of regressions 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15, which determine the 
influence of the different explanatory variables on the variation of thresholds. 
Regression 11: ∆Y* = δ0 + δ1 T + δ2 Info + δ3 Ord + δ4 TO + u . 
Regression 12: ∆Y* = δ0 + δ2 Info + u . 
Regression 13: ∆Y* = γ0 + γ1 Ri + u . 
Regressions 14-15: ∆Y* = γ0 + γ1 T + γ2 Ri + γ3 Ord + γ4 TO + u . 
Explaining variables: estimated coefficients δi 
(t-values) 
No. Data source 
(number of 
observations) Intercept T Info Ord TO Ri 
R2 
 
Adjusted R2 
11 11.81 
(9.14) 
0.33 
(0.20) 
1.76 
(1.52) 
-0.08 
(-0.05) 
1.03 
(0.44) 
 0.14 
-0.04 
12 
All treatments 
(24) 
12.18 
(15.70) 
 1.76 
(1.60) 
   0.10 
0.06 
13 All treatments 
(24) 
16.58 
(5.69) 
    -0.33 
(-1.23) 
0.06 
0.02 
14 Treatments with 
PCI  
(12) 
17.37 
(3.44) 
-0,14 
(-0.05) 
 -2.33 
(-0.93) 
2.22 
(0.62) 
-0.25 
(-0.59) 
0.17 
-0.30 
15 Treatments with 
2CS (12) 
20.69 
(6.21) 
0.79 
(0.49) 
 2.42 
(1.49) 
-0.17 
(-0.07) 
-1.02 
(-3.16) 
0.66 
0.46 
Table 14 – Regressions explaining the width of the interval of indeterminate outcomes. 
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Table 15 sums up the results of regressions 16 and 17, which determine the influence of the 
different explanatory variables on the mean and variance of the probability of an attack. 
Regression 16: a/(b+c) = α0 + α1 T + α2 Info + α3 Ord + α4 TO + u 
Regression 17: pi/((b+c) 3 ) = υ0 + υ1 T + υ2 Info + υ3 Ord + υ4 TO + u 
Explaining variables: Coefficients 
(t-values) 
No. Data source 
(number of 
observations) Intercept T Info Ord TO 
R2 
 
Adj. R2 
        
16 24 27.54 
(22.29) 
25.92 
(16.59) 
4.15 
(3.76) 
14.31 
(9.16) 
-13.50 
(-6.11) 
0.95 
0.94 
17 24 7.26 
(2.58) 
1.32 
(0.37) 
2.06 
(0.82) 
4.41 
(1.24) 
-6.96 
(-1.38) 
0.15 
-0.02 
Table 15 – Linear regressions on estimated mean and variance thresholds. 
